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Wilderness-allow the idea to inhabit your mind's eye for a mo-
ment. Typically, an image of trees and perhaps mountain peaks, al-
pine flowers, or wildlife will emerge. If you have ever been to a true
wilderness, you will also recall a profound stillness, due not to any
actual silence, but to the absence of the normal sounds of our every-
day lives.
This image, however, is far from an accurate description of many
of the areas that Congress and the U.S. Forest Service proudly label
Wilderness Areas under the 1964 Wilderness Act.' The integrity of
these wilderness areas has been eroded by economic pressures for
development and the contradictory management objectives of the
government agencies that administer the areas. To envision a mod-
ern wilderness accurately, then, you must add to your mental pic-
ture, among other things, trails, shelters, hardened campsites,
portable toilets, and corrals for commercial outfitters. The image
now comes closer to the bureaucratic reality. To envision the issue
at stake in the recent decisions in Sierra Club v. Block and Sierra Club v.
Lyng," you must compromise your original image of wilderness even
further and remove or reduce the flow of water in the rivers, lakes,
and streams. It is the realization of this final image, however, that
these two recent Colorado district court rulings attempt to prevent
by establishing the existence of federal reserved water rights in wil-
derness areas.
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982). It should be noted that the vast majority of wil-
derness areas designated under the Wilderness Act of 1964 are located in the western
states. This paper addresses only these western areas.
2. Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985); Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661
F. Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 1987).
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It seems obvious that Congress could not have intended to allow
the water in land reserved as wilderness to be diverted for other
uses, ultimately turning these areas into barren wastelands. Apart
from the beauty of free-flowing rivers, wilderness is valued for scien-
tific research, for which the natural water cycles are invaluable.
Some of the leading research on ecosystem patterns and functioning
are based on watershed nutrient cycling data.3 Any alteration of the
natural watershed functioning would adversely impact and perhaps
invalidate research of this type. 4 Groundwater is equally important
in the functioning of natural processes such as soil formation and
patterns of vegetation. A decrease in saturation levels or in the
water table could affect nutrient concentrations, as well as cycling
and leaching processes in the soil. All of these factors in turn influ-
ence the rest of the wilderness ecosystem. Thus, the unique value of
wilderness as a reservoir of genetic materials and a control against
which to measure human impact in other ecosystems would be ad-
versely affected by any change in the watershed.
Scientific and economic concerns, however, should not be viewed
as the only, or even the most important, reason for a complete res-
ervation of water in wilderness areas. Economic and scientific argu-
ments may be countered in a degenerating battle of statistics, but
the Wilderness Act is not about statistics; it is about moral values-
the recognition that wilderness has value as wilderness.5 Funda-
mentally, these values were espoused by Congress in 1964. No eco-
nomic gain was foreseen by that Congress, nor were tangible
scientific benefits weighed. Primary consideration was given to the
preservation of lands untrammeled by man, and opportunities for
solitude or primitive recreation.6 Unless Congress expressly alters
this value judgment, it should not be permitted to be whittled away.
As legal commentator Michael McCloskey observed, the Act:
has blended many political, religious and cultural meanings into
deeply felt personal convictions .... Those who administer that law
must look to these convictions to understand why the law exists. The
3. The best known example of this type of research is the long-running study of the
Hubbard Brook Experimental Forest in New Hampshire conducted by Yale, Cornell,
and Dartmouth Universities in conjunction with the U.S. Forest Service.
4. Researchers at Hubbard Brook do not permit visitors even to enter the controlled
watershed areas; this prohibition is established in order to prevent any inadvertant im-
pact on the data being collected.
5. The concept of the preservationist as moralist is explored in J. Sax, Mountains
Without Handrails (1980).
6. See The Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (1976).
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convictions cannot be easily manipulated or refashioned to suit the
administrators. 7
Indeed, after considering the legislative history of the Wilderness
Act, Judge Kane's opinions in Block and Lyng enforced the original
intent of the Wilderness Act in finding that wilderness areas carry
appurtenant water reservations. These decisions effectively gave
the rights to potentially all water in wilderness areas to the federal
government as of the date of designation of the area as wilderness.
The holdings evoked sharp and critical reactions from western
water interests.8 Ten senators 9 sent a letter to James McClure,
Chairman of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, in-
sisting that:
The federal government has no implied right to water as a result of
wilderness designation, but must establish any right to use water for
wilderness purposes within the framework of State water law.... We
believe further that no additional wilderness legislation should be
passed unless these principles are clearly reaffirmed in federal law.1o
Another senator charged that "(a) lawyer for the Sierra Club has
been out having an adventure, and Congress may end up designat-
ing nothing but mountaintops as wilderness."'' This statement is
particularly ironic since almost all the western wilderness is, in fact,
comprised of mountaintops.
Concern that the district court would rule precisely as it did had
actually created the threatened block on wilderness designations as
early as 1984. Water is the only issue stalling passage of a Colorado
wilderness bill.' 2 An amendment to the Nevada wilderness bill was
proposed in anticipation of the pending decision, an amendment
that would have denied the existence of reserved water rights in the
7. McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Background and Meaning, 45 Or. L.
Rev. 288, 295 (1966).
8. One politician stated, "We woke up one morning to find that Judge Kane had
decided we intended to do something we never even considered." Drabelle. The Life-
blood of Wilderness, Wilderness, Fall 1987. at 36, 37 [hereinafter Drabellel: See also
Reid, Wilderness Areas Ruled to Have Water Rights, Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 1985, at A4,
col. 1; Wilderness Ruling Raises Questions on Water Use, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1. 1985, at
27.
9. The signatories were: Chic Hecht, Jake Garn, Paul Laxalt, Alan Simpson, Barry
Goldwater, Malcolm Wallop, Bill Armstrong, Steve Symms, Orrin Hatch, and Mark An-
drews. Letter to Senator James McClure (Oct. 20, 1986).
10. The Senators also expressed concern that "Jal right to preserve historic flows
would be in direct conflict with future development of water, particularly the storage of
water which, by its very nature, is designed to alter stream flows." id.
1I. Sen. Jim Beirne, Minority Counsel to the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural
Resources, quoted in Drabelle, supra note 8, at 37.
12. Drabellc, supra note 8, at 38.
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designated areas.' 3 Despite this opposition, those who support
Judge Kane's decision believe that without reserved water rights, the
philosophy embodied in the Wilderness Act would be compromised
to the point of irrelevance.
Legislation is needed to respond to this impasse, legislation that
would uphold, and even expand, the rulings in Block and Lyng. Wil-
derness water rights should be quantified statutorily as that amount
of streamflow and groundwater that existed at the time of the origi-
nal reservation under the Wilderness Act. While such a broad
gauge would not be suitable in most federal enclaves, the economic
considerations and compromises acceptable, even desirable, in the
context of other federal reservations are not appropriate in relation
to the philosophy of wilderness preservation that underlies the Wil-
derness Act of 1964. Unlike other federal reservations, wilderness
areas are highly restricted use areas and, once degraded, are irre-
placeable. The intuitive character of wilderness has already been
substantially compromised, but somewhere a line must be drawn.
There must come a point at which the original moral judgment un-
derlying the Wilderness Act, rather than the motivations of the spe-
cial compromise provisions, guides management directives. The
rights to wilderness waters is that point.
L Genesis and Evolution of the Judicial Doctrine of Federal
Reserved Water Rights
The judicially created doctrine of federal reserved water rights
evolved from the 1908 Supreme Court decision in Winters v. United
States.' 4 In Winters, the United States brought suit to restrain the
defendants from diverting waters of the Milk River and its tributa-
ries that would otherwise flow through the Fort Belknap Indian Res-
ervation. The United States had not expressly reserved water rights
in the 1888 treaty establishing the reservation. Nevertheless, the
Court determined that both common sense and the rules of treaty
13. H.R. 3302, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. D1327 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1985).
Bills currently being held up include: H.R. 568 (establishment of a raptor preserve);
H.R. 3302 (Nevada Wilderness Bill); and the 1984 Colorado Wilderness Bill.
14. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). See also United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.,
174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899) ("in the absence of specific authority from Congress a State
cannot by its legislation destroy the right of the United States ... to the continued flow
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construction' 5 mandated a reservation as of 1888 of the water nec-
essary for irrigation.' 6
The courts long regarded Winters as a legal aberration relevant
only to cases involving Native American rights.' 7 In 1955, however,
the Supreme Court expanded its holding in Winters with the decision
in Federal Power Commission v. Oregon. ' While the Court did not make
explicit a reserved water rights doctrine for non-Native American
lands, it did indicate for the first time that federal reserved lands are
not subject to state water laws.' 9
Western water users were quick to realize the import of this deci-
sion. The federal government not only controlled unappropriated
waters on federal reserved lands, but also controlled appropriated
water if the federal reservation was made prior to appropriation
under state laws.20 Because federal reserved water rights may lie
dormant and unquantified without being lost, junior appropriators
remained uncertain of their rights.2' Consequently, calls arose for
comprehensive legislation addressing the scope of federal water
rights. The first of a number of "Western Water Rights Settlement
Acts" was introduced that same year. 22
15. "'By a rule of interpretation of agreements and treaties with the Indians, ambigu-
ities occurring will be resolved from the standpoint of the Indians." WIinters, 207 U.S. at
576.
16. In the western states, water rights are determined on a "first in time, first in
right" principle. In Colorado, "the first person to divert unappropriated water and to
apply it to a beneficial use has a water right superior to subsequent appropriators from
the same water source." Navajo Dev. Co., Inc. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1377
(Colo. 1982). Priority rights are used to apportion limited water resources. For exam-
ple, if two people were each using 10 gallons of water per day, and the available water
decreased seasonally to 15 gallons per day, the individual who first began using the
water, the senior appropriator, would still be entitled to 10 gallons per day. The junior
appropriator would receive only five gallons per day. In Winters, Native American rights
were held to be superior to defendants' appropriations even though actual use by the
Native Americans occurred after that of defendants.
17. See Trelease, Federal Reserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 Den. L. J. 473,
475 (1977).
18. 349 U.S. 435 (1955) (holding that the Desert Land Act of 1877 applies only to
public lands open to settlement, not reserved lands: and authorization to build a hydroe-
lectric plant on federal reserved lands does not require the consent of the state in which
those lands lie).
19. This holding was later made more explicit in Nevada v. United States, 165 F.
Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), afd. on other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960).
20. This is true even if the junior appropriator did not, and prior to the ruling in FPC
v. Oregon could not, know that the federal reservation carried water rights.
21. See Comment, Federal Reserved Water Rights in National Forest Wilderness Ar-
eas, 21 Land & Water L. Rev. 381 (1986).
22. S. 863, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 101 Cong. Rec. 1019 (1955). Thirty-eight water
rights bills were introduced in Congress between 1955 and 1964. See Note, Federal
Water Rights Legislation and the Reserved Lands Controversy, 53 Geo. LJ. 750, 768-70
(1965).
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The fear of western water interests-that waters they believed
they had legitimately appropriated were actually subject to federal
reserved water rights-was borne out eight years later. In Arizona v.
California,23 the Supreme Court expressly found that federal re-
served water rights exist in non-Native American reservations, in-
cluding National Forests, Wildlife Refuges, and National Recreation
Areas. The extent of the reservation was held to be that amount of
water sufficient for the requirements of the federal purposes of the
lands.2 4
The Supreme Court continued in the tradition of an expansive
reserved rights doctrine in Cappaert v. United States.2 5 The Cappaerts
had pumped water from their wells to such an extent that the water
level was lowered in a subterranean pool located on federal land.
The pool contained the only population of Devil's Hole pupfish.
The United States successfully enjoined the Cappaerts from pump-
ing this groundwater. For the first time, the Court held that re-
served water rights affect groundwater as well as surface water. Yet
the Court did not explicitly apply reserved rights to groundwater as
such, only to that groundwater necessary to maintain the reserved
surface water. Citing Arizona v. California,26 the Court simultane-
ously limited the reserved quantity to that amount necessary to
maintain the underground pool and preserve its scientific value as
set forth by the Presidential Proclamation. 27
The slight narrowing trend of Cappaert was continued in United
States v. New Mexico.28 In this case, the United States claimed re-
served water rights for the Gila National Forest, arguing that Con-
gress intended to reserve water for aesthetic, recreational, and fish
23. 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
24. 373 U.S. at 601.
Responding to the decision in Arizona v. California, the Public Land Law Review Com-
mission (PLLRC), created by Congress to review use of United States public lands,
called for quantification of prospective government water requirements, elimination of
implied reserved water rights for future reservations, and compensation for water taken
from a state appropriator whose interest had vested prior to the decision in Arizona v.
California. See Trelease, siupra note 17, at 479.
Again, in 1971 a National Water Commission Legal Study recommended that the fed-
eral government abandon the reserved rights doctrine and rely instead on eminent do-
main. The Commission further recommended that the government comply with the
procedures set forth in state water laws. The recommendations of both the PLLRC and
the Commission were generally ignored. See F. Trelease, Federal-State Relations in
Water Law, (Nat'l Water Comm. Legal Study No. 5) (1971) [hereinafter Trelease, Legal
Study No. 51.
25. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
26. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
27. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141.
28. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
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preservation purposes. The Court, relying heavily on legislative
analysis, held against the government, finding that "Congress in-
tended that water would be reserved only where necessary to pre-
serve the timber or to secure favorable water flows." 2 9 These, the
Court stated, were the only purposes set forth under the Organic
Act of 1897, which established the National Forests. 30 The addi-
tional purposes enumerated in the Multiple-Use and Sustained-
Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA) were held to be secondary purposes for
which no additional water was reserved.3'
A further functional limitation of federal reserved water rights oc-
curred in Sierra Club v. Andrus.32 The Sierra Club sought an order
requiring the Department of the Interior to define and protect es-
tablished federal reserved water rights in four specific water courses
in southern Utah and northern Arizona: (1) the Escalante River; (2)
the Paria River; (3) Kanab Creek; and (4) Johnson Wash. Each of
these water courses was the subject of ongoing general adjudication
in Utah state courts,3 3 adjudications in which the United States had
not been joined and did not intend to intervene. 34
The Court found that the Department had not abused its discre-
tion by failing to intervene because: (1) federal reserved water
rights could not have been lost or harmed by nonassertion at that
time, and (2) the relief sought was currently being attained through
administrative means.3 5 The practical result of this decision was to
29. 438 U.S. at 718.
30. 438 U.S. at 718. The Organic Act of 1897 defined the purposes for which na-
tional forests can be reserved, and established a charter for forest management. 16
U.S.C.A. §§ 473-475 (West 1985). The Organic Act provides in pertinent part:
No national forest shall be established, except to improve and protect the forest
within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water
flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of
citizens of the United States.
16 U.S.C.A. § 475 (West 1985).
31. Justice Lewis Powell's strong dissent noted that this portion of the opinion ap-
peared to be dicta, since the United States was not claiming that the MUSYA affected a
reservation of additional water. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 719 (1978)
(Powell, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, this dicta has been given precedential weight in
later decisions. See, e.g., Block, 622 F.Supp. 842.
32. 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980).
33. These adjudications were undertaken pursuant to the filing of water rights appli-
cations for several energy projects.
34. Under the McCarran Act, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976), the United States may be
joined as a party in any state adjudication of water rights. See United States v. District
Court, 401 U.S. 520 (1971) (holding that the McCarran Act subjects all water rights of
the United States within a particular state's jurisdiction to general adjudication in state
proceedings).
35. 487 F.Supp. at 452.
In August 1978 the Interagency Task Force on Federal Non-Indian Reserved Water
Rights was formed pursuant to President Jimmy Carter's water policy announcement of
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prevent the orderly protection of federal reserved water rights. The
federal government may choose to act after the state has reached a
decision in the initial state proceedings and/or a state appropriator,
by initiating use, has made a significant investment.
The application, scope, and enforcement of the principles of fed-
eral reserved water rights remain to be defined with respect to the
National Wilderness Preservation System. However, the doctrine it-
self is now clear. When the United States removes land from the
public domain and reserves the land for a specific purpose, it may
simultaneously reserve the rights to the amount of water necessary
to fulfill the purposes of the reservation. If the government does
not make an express reservation, the courts will infer a reservation if
the waters are vital to fulfill the primary purpose of the
reservation. 36
II. Moral Intent of the Wilderness Act of 1964
The well-documented ideological and political history of the Wil-
derness Act from inception to final passage provides an illuminating
background against which to assess the value of reserved water
rights in wilderness areas. 37 Wilderness areas were first set aside,
and thereby recognized as having value as wilderness, under the
Forest Service Organic Act of 1897.38 The first official designation
of wilderness within national forest lands occurred in 1924 in the
Gila National Forest of New Mexico. 3 9 In 1939, the Forest Service
adopted a new set of regulations for the administration of wilder-
ness areas. These so-called "U-regulations" shaped Forest Service
policy until the passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964.
The U-regulations gave new administrative strength to wilderness
designation, prohibiting commercial timbering, roads, building con-
struction, grazing, the use of motorboats, and the landing of air-
planes in these areas. However, the areas protected under the U-
regulations were still threatened by the economic upswing that came
June 6, 1978. The task force issued its report on June 15, 1979, recommending system-
atic quantification of all federal reserved water rights. At the time Andrus was handed
down, federal agencies had begun to act on those recommendations. This process has
never been completed.
36. See Trelease, Legal Study No. 5, supra note 24.
37. It took nine years and 18 hearings before the Wilderness Act was passed. The
initial five-year Senate battle alone generated over 2,000 pages of hearing transcripts.
38. McCloskey, supra note 7, at 296.
39. R. Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind 186 (1967).
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with World War 11.40 The Forest Service, despite internal reguia-
tions, remained legally powerless to prevent mining, dam construc-
tion, and water projects within wilderness areas. 4'
The post-war period also saw the growth of private conservation
organizations. A. Starker Leopold, a prominent preservationist, saw
this conservation movement as a sign of "respect for nature as it
existed in the first place. It is the emergence of this element of re-
spect that deserves special attention, for it marks a turning point in
man's view of the earth. ' 42 As the frontier disappeared and open
spaces became scarce, the frontier mentality, which held natural re-
sources to be unlimited, began to change. Among other considera-
tions, it became necessary to weigh aesthetic and spiritual values
against questions of economics and pragmatism. Environmental
protection became a moral issue.43
It was in this atmosphere that, on June 7, 1956, Senator Hubert
Humphrey introduced a bill that appeared to be relatively uncon-
troversial; it neither required the establishment of a new agency, nor
altered any jurisdiction of existing agencies, nor required funding of
any significance. The bill changed only one of the many sets of reg-
ulations governing public lands-those governing less than 2% of
all the land in the United States. 44
The first hearings on the Wilderness Act set the pattern for the
debates that would follow. The opposition of the mining and lum-
ber interests was anticipated by the preservationists, but attacks
from water interests were not; of 19 groups testifying, five were con-
cerned with water rights.45
The most important of the concerns raised were those of the Cali-
fornia Department of W'iter Resources. The Department feared
that some of their planned water projects, vital to the economy of
California, would be banned by the proposed legislation. Perhaps
concerned about adverse public reaction, the testimony given by the
Department regarding the nature and location of these proposed
40. The economic pressures were graphically illustrated in a doctoral dissertation by
James P. Gilligan. Gilligan criticized management practices of the period and cited nu-
merous exceptions to the regulations. In 28 of the largest areas of designated wilder-
ness. areas of over 100,000 acres in size, he documented 200 miles of roads, 145,000
acres in inholdings, between 400-500 mining claims, 60 active mines, 24 airstrips. pas-
ture for 140,000 sheep and 25,000 cattle, and 90 dams. J. P. Gilligan, The Contradiction
of Wilderness Preservation in a Democracy, reprinted in 102 Cong. Rec. 12313 (1956).
41. U1-1 and U-2, 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.20, 251.21 (now superseded).
42. Quoted in P. Brooks, Speaking for Nature 255 (1980).
43. Id.
44. The Wilderness Act. S. 4013, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 Cong. Rec. 9772 (1956).
45. C. Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation 108-09 (1982).
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water projects was diplomatically vague and quite moderate in
tone. 46 However, a California newspaper, which supported the bill,
substantially discredited the testimony of the Department of Water
Resources when it reported that the Department's projects included
a number of radical infringements on wilderness areas: infringe-
ments already prohibited by management agency regulations. The
projects were reported to include a dam in Yosemite National Park,
possible tunnels under the Marble Mountain Wilderness, reservoirs
for hydroelectric plants, and canals through the LavaBeds National
Monuments and the Joshua Tree National Monument. 47
One frustrated preservationist commented at the hearings, "It has
been my own theory that California is going to run out of fresh air
before it runs out of water."-48 In fact, water collections could just as
easily be made downhill where the water would inevitably end up.
The Department eventually was appeased by the addition of a
provision granting the President power to authorize the construc-
tion of reservoirs and water facilities within wilderness areas if he
deemed this use to be more beneficial to the American people than
its denial. In addition, sponsors of the bill added a clause stating
that nothing in the bill was intended to affect established federal-
state relationships regarding water laws. Defendant intervenors in
Sierra Club v. Lyng 49 unsuccessfully pointed to these compromises to
support their contention that there are no federal reserved water
rights attached to wilderness reservations.
The legislative battles over the Wilderness Act reflected the new
post-war relationship between people and the land. In an early
speech advocating passage of the bill, Howard Zahniser, then execu-
tive secretary of the Wilderness Society, editor of The Living [ilder-
ness, and honorary vice-president of the Sierra Club, captured the
preservation philosophy that informs the Wilderness Act. He cited
"our compulsion to save from destruction whatever is best," 51 and
went on to address the growing popularity of recreation which was
degrading many back-country areas:
46. National Wilderness Preservation Act: Hearings on S. 1176 Before the Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 83-86 (1957) [hereinafter Hearings
onS. 11761.
47. J. McClatchy, Water Developers Fight Wilderness Area Proposal, Sacramento
Bee, Feb. 19, 1957, at 8, col. B.
48. Hearings on S. 1176, supra note 46, at 348 (statement of David Brower).
49. 661 F. Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 1985).




Wilderness Reserved Water Rights
It is, of course, not surprising that recreational values are generally
understood as representing the dominant importance of wilderness in
our modern society. Only in a society that produces the erosion of
human beings, the wearing away of soul and body and spirit that is so




Zahniser was clearly addressing a friendly audience with whom he
could afford to wax poetic. He even went so far as to claim that in
wilderness lay the basis for our humanity. Yet in the end, it was just
such lofty philosophy that ensured passage of the bill, for it ap-
pealed to the general public and inspired environmental organiza-
tion memberships. It is, therefore, this philosphy that must be
looked to in implementing the Wilderness Act.
The definition of wilderness that finally emerged from the polit-
ical and philosophical battles reads:
A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own
works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where
the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where
man himself is a visitor who does not remain .... [It is] an area of
undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influ-
ence, without permanent improvements or human habitation, which is
protected and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and
which (1) generally appears to have been affected primarily by the
forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially un-
noticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primi-
tive and unconfined type of recreation; (3) has at least five thousand
acres of land or is of sufficient size as to make practicable its preserva-
tion and use in an unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain eco-
logical, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic,
or historical value. 52
This definition has been, and continues to be, the subject of bitter
debate. Contradictions between this definition and many of the spe-
cial use and compromise provisions (e.g., the clause preserving fed-
eral-state relationships regarding water laws, added to appease
water concerns) are inherent in the Wilderness Act. These contra-
dictions are now echoed in incoherent management objectives and
practices. For example, special provisions permit prospecting, the
use of motorboats and aircraft where the use was already estab-
lished, and the grazing of livestock subject to regulation by the Sec-
retary of Agriculture.
53
51. Id. at 38.
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1982).
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (1982).
167
Yale Law & Policy Review
The original management objectives mandated by the Act are:
[to administer wilderness areas] for the use and enjoyment of the
American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for
future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for the
protection of these areas, the preservation of their wilderness charac-
ter and for the gathering and dissemination of information regarding
their use and enjoyment as wilderness .... 54
A current Forest Service brochure seems to indicate that the Forest
Service is holding true to these objectives. 55 It lists the following
management goals for wilderness areas: (1) to perpetuate a system
of high quality wilderness; (2) to provide opportunities for public
use, enjoyment, and understanding of a wilderness experience; (3)
to maintain plants and animals native to the area; (4) to maintain
healthy watersheds; (5) to protect threatened or endangered spe-
cies; and (6) to maintain the primitive character of wilderness as a
benchmark for comparison with lands that have been developed.
Yet this same brochure embodies the contradictory character of the
Act by approving the following uses "as long as they do not ad-
versely affect the area": trails, bridges, hunting, fishing, prospecting
for minerals, shelters, pit or vault toilets, hitching racks and corrals
for commercial outfitters, aerial fish stocking programs, weather sta-
tions, improvements for grazing, and structures to protect soil,
water, or vegetation. Furthermore, the Forest Service adds: "don't
be surprised to see some other activities that don't seem to fit the
wilderness concept we've described!" It is difficult to reconcile a
mandate to maintain the primitive character of wilderness with the
approval of shelters, toilets, and bridges.
In some situations where secondary provisions of a statute contra-
dict the basic purpose of the statute, courts have refused to enforce
the incompatible provisions rather than impair the expressed intent
of the statute. A federal district court, for example, held that de-
spite the provision of the Wilderness Act permitting surface mineral
exploration, such activity was prohibited by the plain purpose of the
Wilderness Act. 56
If the premise is accepted that mining activities and wilderness are
opposing values and are anathema each to the other, then it would
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1982).
55. Forest Service, U.S. Dep't of Agric., Keeping the 'Wild' in Wilderness, Pub. No.
FS-319 (1978).
56. lzaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair, 353 F. Supp. 698 (D. Minn. 1973),
rev'd., 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974) (remanded for initial determination by the Forest
Service of suitability of mining; held that Congress did not intend to ban all mining).
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seem that in enacting the Wilderness Act Congress engaged in an ex-
ercise of futility if the court is to adopt the view that mineral rights
prevail over wilderness objectives.... To create wilderness and in the
same breath to allow for its destruction could not have been the real
Congressional intent and a court should not construe or presume an
Act of Congress to be meaningless if an alternative analysis is
available. 5 7
Wilderness preservation and compromise are by nature contradic-
tory terms.
Some believe that the Wilderness Act only adds legality to abuses
of the wilderness designation, and removes the moral foundation
from which future battles could be waged. Certainly, the preserva-
tionists did not succeed completely in promoting the legislation of a
"moral issue" in a democracy. Their failure has resulted in numer-
ous legal battles over the intent of the bill, the latest of which is that
over the existence and scope of federal reserved water rights in wil-
derness areas.
III. Sierra Club v. Block Reserved Water Rights in Wilderness Areas
It seemed as if the controversy over the existence of federal re-
served water rights in wilderness areas was settled when Judge Kane
ruled in Block that "[flederal reserved water rights do exist in . ..
each of the Colorado wilderness areas designated as such pursuant
to the Wilderness Act ... "58 Rather than settling the issue, how-
ever, this ruling only seemed to create greater controversy. In Block,
the Sierra Club raised three claims against John Block, then Secre-
tary of Agriculture, and other government officials: 5 9 (1) that fed-
eral reserved water rights exist in wilderness areas under the
Wilderness Act; (2) that the federal defendants violated their duties
in not claiming these rights; (3) that this failure to claim the water
rights was arbitrary and capricious and therefore constituted unlaw-
fully withheld agency action.6 0
57. 353 F. Supp. at 715. See also Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz,
358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn. 1973) (prohibiting limited logging in the Boundary Waters
Canoe Area); Haight, The Wilderness Act: Ten Years After, 3 Envt'l Aff. 275 (1974).
58. 622 F. Supp. at 862.
59. A number of organizations representing western water interests were permitted
to intervene as defendants, including: Mountain States Legal Foundation, Colorado Cat-
tlemen's Association, Colorado Farm Bureau, National Cattlemen's Association, the City
and County of Denver, the Colorado Water Conservation Board, and the Colorado
Water Congress.
60. 622 F. Supp. at 846.
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Defendants contended that federal reserved water rights did not
exist in wilderness areas because designation of an area as wilder-
ness does not constitute an original withdrawal from the public do-
main. Such a withdrawal, they argued, is required to establish
federal reserved water rights.6 1 Defendants claimed that wilderness
designation failed to affect a withdrawal both because designation is
merely a management directive and because only the original with-
drawal of lands from the public domain could establish implied re-
served water rights. The lands involved in Colorado had been
originally withdrawn from the public domain as National Forest
lands.
Judge Kane ruled against the defendants on both issues. He held
that the Wilderness Act is not a management directive on the
ground that, under the Act, wilderness areas were withdrawn from
use-related laws, and specific federal purposes were designated for
the lands. Further, he reasoned that a secondary rather than the
original withdrawal is sufficient to establish reserved water rights.
Judge Kane also examined the intent of Congress in passing the
Wilderness Act. Defendants argued that under the New Mexico 62 rul-
ing, the Wilderness Act must be equated with the Multiple-Use and
Sustained-Yield Act (MUSYA). That is, the purposes set forth in the
Wilderness Act, as those set forth in the MUSYA, conflict with the
original purposes of the National Forests and create only secondary
purposes with no appurtenant water rights. In Judge Kane's view,
however, the Wilderness Act is distinguishable from the MUSYA in
that: (1) It is not a land management act; and (2) it created an en-
tirely new reservation of land. Moreover, he wrote, the purposes of
the Wilderness Act do not conflict with the purposes set forth in the
Organic Act of 1897.63
Judge Kane admonished the defendants for not being sufficiently
dutiful in asserting federal reserved water rights in wilderness areas,
but he did not find an arbitrary or capricious neglect of duty.64
Conceding that he was "without power to order the Attorney Gen-
eral to instigate litigation to claim these rights," 65 Judge Kane or-
61. 622 F. Supp. at 853.
62. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
63. 622 F. Supp. at 859-62. See also Lyng, 661 F. Supp. at 1492-95 (includes a further
discussion of the existence of federal reserved water rights in wilderness areas).
64. 622 F. Supp. at 864. See also Abrams, Water in the Western Wilderness: The
Duty to Assert Reserved Water Rights, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 387 [hereinafter Abrams].
65. Block, 622 F. Supp. at 864 (citations omitted).
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dered defendants to submit a report explaining how they intended
to protect the character of the wilderness areas.
After an appeal from this order failed, the Forest Service submit-
ted a brief report on November 26, 1986.1t" Meanwhile, the defend-
ant intervenors67 sought reconsideration of the original ruling
establishing the existence of reserved water rights in wilderness ar-
eas. They argued that the provision of the Wilderness Act that
reads, "[n]othing in this chapter shall constitute an express or im-
plied claim or denial on the part of the Federal Government as to
exemption from State water laws," 68 expressly prohibits the estab-
lishment of federal reserved water rights. This is the clause origi-
nally added to appease the California Department of Water
Resources."t '
On June 3, 1987, Judge Kane handed down a second decision,
sub nom Sierra Club v. Lyng. 70 He ruled against defendant interven-
ors, holding that the clause at issue was meant solely to maintain the
status quo. Judge Kane also held that the Forest Service plan as
submitted constituted an abuse of discretion by the agency. Clearly
infuriated by the inadequacy of the Forest Service Report, he referred
to the report "in its portentous three page entirety," stating
that "[t]he plan submitted ... is woefully inadequate and consti-
tutes an insouciant disregard of the government's statutory
responsibility. ... 71
It is important to note that both rulings requiring the Forest Ser-
vice to compile a coherent plan stemmed largely from the operation
of the postponement doctrine in Colorado. 72 This doctrine pro-
vides that if a senior appropriator does not adjudicate his water
rights in the same or a previous calendar year as a junior appropria-
tor, the senior appropriator's rights are subordinated to those of the
junior appropriator. 73 Thus, inaction by the federal government
could result in a subordination of federal water rights to a junior
66. Report by Forest Service on Methods for Protecting Wilderness Water Re-
sources on Lands in Colorado Submitted to Judge Kane (Sept. 22, 1987) [hereinafter
Forest Service Rep.I.
67. See supra note 59.
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(6).
69. See supra text at 166.
70. 661 F. Supp. 1490.
71. 661 F. Supp. at 1501.
72. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-306 (1973). See Lyng, 661 F. Supp. at 1496 (discussion
of Colorado's unique postponement doctrine in relation to the maintenance of federal
reserved water rights).
73. This doctrine has been held to apply to federal reserved water rights. See United
States v. Bell, 724 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1986).
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appropriator. The postponement doctrine, unique to Colorado,
makes it necessary for the Forest Service to have a rational plan for
protecting water rights. This doctrine, in turn, allowed Judge Kane
to avoid the finding of Andrus that, in fact, no harm resulted from
nonassertion .74
The Forest Service plan acknowledged the role of the postpone-
ment doctrine. On the one hand, the plan stated that "wilderness
reserved rights could possibly be subject to the Colorado postpone-
ment doctrine ... making them junior to virtually all presently adju-
dicated rights." On the other hand, it asserted that "there are a
number of conditional water rights within the designated wilderness
areas . . . .[but] [m]ost of these rights are of doubtful validity for
failure of their owners to satisfy the diligence requirements of Colo-
rado law. ' 75 In short, the longer the federal government remains
inactive, the more conditional rights may become perfected and
therefore superior to those of the government. In fact, prompt ac-
tion by the government to adjudicate its rights could move the gov-
ernment's priority above that of senior appropriators who fail to
similarly adjudicate within the same calendar year.
Still, Judge Kane reiterated that he was powerless to order the
Attorney General to initiate such action. He ordered the Forest Ser-
vice to submit a more complete plan and concluded with a clear call
for legislative action:
[T]he issues in this case are permeated with conflicting philosophical
views and economic interests which properly should be resolved by
the political branches of government. While a court can resolve ambi-
guities and conform executive implementation to legislative intent, it
is not the court's business to create policy. Until enlightened by a
more precise articulation of legislative policy, it is my intent to enforce
with vigor the intent of Congress as I perceive it to be.7 6
Judge Kane's frustration is evident, as is the need for a Congres-
sional resolution of this debate. The opinions in both Block and
Lyng struggle with fine legal distinctions in an attempt to fit the pa-
rameters of earlier decisions relating to non-wilderness areas. The
decisions rest on tenuous foundations in the light of New Mexico.
These foundations are further undermined by ever-increasing de-
velopment pressures, the increase in wilderness recreation itself,
and the contradictory provisions that have already diverted the im-
74. 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980).
75. Lyng, 661 F. Supp. at 1499.
76. 661 F. Supp. at 1502.
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plementation of the Wilderness Act far from the original intent. 77
Furthermore, the district court rulings concerning the issue of en-
forcement are insufficient to preserve the water rights vital to the
integrity of wilderness areas.
IV A Proposal for Legislative Action
The true debate over the existence and scope of federal reserved
water rights in wilderness areas has already taken place in Congress.
The intent of Congress is evident, and further legislation should
therefore be unnecessary. Nevertheless, due to the current Admin-
istration's lack of enthusiasm for even moderate enforcement, the
special provision language of the Wilderness Act has facilitated deg-
radation of this intent. This degradation must not extend to the
denial of federal reserved water rights in wilderness areas. To pre-
vent such an extension, the legislature now must articulate more
specifically its original intent to preserve the wilderness areas and
remove them from the general debate over the validity of federal
reserved water rights.
Since the doctrine of federal reserved water rights was first ex-
panded in 1955 there have been numerous attempts to legislate a
resolution of the ensuing controversy.78 No consensus has yet been
achieved. However, the National Wilderness Preservation System
represents a highly specialized and limited area of reserved water
rights, a fact that perhaps would facilitate the formation of a consen-
sus for such a limited bill. The bill would necessarily restrict future
projects of western water interests. Nevertheless, legislative quanti-
fication would also benefit western water interests by diminishing
the uncertainty that currently inhibits water rights appropriators
from investing in water-dependent development projects. If the bill
is carefully drafted, stressing that federal reserved water rights per-
tain for reasons unique to wilderness areas, perhaps a consensus
could be achieved.
In order to accomplish these ends, a wilderness water rights bill
should include the following provisions:
77. Some wilderness areas near urban areas in Colorado are so popular that one
sees dozens of people when hiking in the area. As early as 1983, environmental organi-
zations and the Forest Service debated the benefits of installing hardened campsites and
portable toilets to minimize the physical degradation in these areas. In some areas the
Forest Service has stopped marking the wilderness areas on its public maps because the
designation alone tends to attract even more visitors. (Observations made by author
while working with the Colorado Open Space Council in Denver, Colo., 1983).
78. See supra note 22.
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(1) The legislature must espouse e.presslv the ruling in Block T that fed-
eral reserved water rights exist in wilderness areas.
Judge Kane's determination that wilderness areas are endowed
with reserved water rights as of the date of their reservation is de-
pendent on two problematic threshhold findings: first, a determina-
tion that wilderness areas were both reserved and withdrawn under
the Wilderness Act; second, a finding that Congress intended to re-
serve this water-i.e., the purposes expressed in the Act are, under
the categories set forth in New Mexico,80 primary rather than
secondary.
The language of the Wilderness Act expressly provides that desig-
nated areas are to be retained and administered by the agency re-
sponsible for the land at the time of passage. Arguably, this
indicates congressional intent to create a strong land management
directive, rather than a de novo reservation and withdrawal of the
lands required for the establishment of reserved water rights. Fur-
thermore, one of the factors that pursuaded the New Mexico court
that the MUSYA was intended as merely a secondary purpose was
that MUSYA conflicted with the original purposes set forth in the
Organic Act of 1897. The Wilderness Act does provide that the
purposes of wilderness areas are not to "be deemed to be in inter-
ference with the purpose for which national forests are estab-
lished.""' However, the provision banning timber-cutting in
wilderness areas flagrantly conflicts with that very purpose of the
national forests. Judge Kane dismissed the conflict in an unconvinc-
ing footnote:
Although Congress mandated that nothing in the Wilderness Act shall
be deemed to be in interference with the purpose for which national
forests are established, it is clear that Congress was not referring to
the purpose of providing a continuous supply of timber .... Con-
gress' mandate that the wilderness purposes are 'within and supple-
mental to' the national forest purposes, including timber-cutting, is a
non-sequitur.82
If the Block decision is not reinforced by congressional action, it
could well be overturned on these bases.
79. 622 F. Supp. 842, 853.
80. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
81. The Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § I 133(a)(1) (1976). For a discussion of the pur-
poses of wilderness areas and National Forests, see supra notes 19-20 and 29 and acconm-
panying text.
82. 622 F. Supp. 842, 860-61 n.13 (1985).
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Further, the legislation must espouse the holding in Block, rather
than establish a current intent to reserve water rights. A current
intent bill would fail to create a federal reserved water right because
the right would not be created in conjunction with the original res-
ervation and withdrawal of land from the public domain. Under a
current intent statute, federal water rights would have to be estab-
lished by eminent domain or in a piecemeal fashion according to
individual state laws. Protecting wilderness water rights through
these means would be problematic. Instream uses, such as main-
taining wilderness streamflows, are of dubious value in establishing
appropriative rights in a number of states. Traditionally, an appro-
priation exists when a person actively diverts water and puts it to a
beneficial use. Although some states have now modified this policy
to protect minimum instream flows, others do not recognize in-
stream use as a valid appropriation. 3
Establishing current intent would also fail to preserve the priority
dates of the original reservations. Under the appropriation system
of water rights prevailing in the western states, any water right is
dependent on actual beneficial use and is subject to water rights es-
tablished earlier in time.84 If legislation simply expressed a present
intent to reserve wilderness water rights, the priority dates of these
rights would fall some 24 years after the date of the original reserva-
tions, thereby potentially subrogating federal claims to those of
otherwise junior appropriators.
(2) Federal reserved water rights in wilderness areas must be defined as
that amount of streamflow and groundwater that existed at the time of the
original reservation into wilderness.
This is an unabashedly broad but eminently reasonable scope for
reserved water rights. The language of the Act itself supports a
broad interpretation: The National Wilderness Preservation System
was created "[i]n order to assure that an increasing population ...
does not occupy and modify all areas within the United States . . .
83. Instream uses are problematic even in the context of a strong federal reserved
water right. See Waring and Samelson, Non-Indian Federal Reserved Water Rights, 58
Den. L.J. 783, 792 (1981):
In addition, Justice Rehnquist's observation that the maintenance of instream flows
within the confines of a national forest is a valid purpose only when Congress "ex-
pressly so directed" casts doubt upon the [Solicitor General'si conclusion that mini-
mum stream and lake levels are reserved by the-designation of wilderness areas.
There is no express direction in the Wilderness Act regarding the reservation of
instream flows.
84. The eastern states follow the riparian system of water rights. Under this system,
ownership of land bordering a body of water determines water rights. See Note. suproa
note 22, at 479.
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leaving no lands designated for preservation and protection in their
natural condition .. ."85
In addition, western wilderness lands are almost exclusively
mountaintop areas originally set aside in part because commercial
interests saw no possible profit in developing them. 6 There are,
consequently, few existing upstream water interests that would be
affected by a total reservation such as this one. In Colorado, for
example, 14 of the 24 wilderness areas have no private lands above
them, and nine of the areas contain the headwaters of their water-
shed.8 7 The concerns of western water interests do not appear to be
with the loss of existing rights, but rather with the loss of possible
future storage projects upstream from the wilderness areas. The
upstream sites, one commentator argues, are attractive for several
reasons, including the low costs of dam construction in the narrow
valleys, and of transporting the water that can flow by gravity from
these high elevations.8 8 However, the report submitted to Judge
Kane by the Forest Service on September 22, 1987, belies these
concerns. The report analyzes the potential for future water devel-
opments on both federal and non-federal lands that might affect wil-
derness water resources. It concludes that all but one of these areas
are undesirable for development due to their topography, their lo-
cation in upper watersheds with limited storage capacity, the cost of
construction, and general engineering feasibility.89 The reservation
of groundwater as well as surface water is vital to the maintenance of
the natural ecosystem, particularly for scientific study.9° Although
the Supreme Court has never expressly held reserved water rights
to extend to groundwater, several lower courts have made this
finding.9 '
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
86. See, Gilligan, supra note 40, 102 Cong. Rec. at 12315.
87. See Forest Service Rep., supra note 66, at 1. See also, Abrams, supra note 64, at
389-90. Those appropriators with rights senior to the federal reservation would remain
unaffected by this legislation. In addition, junior appropriators required to give up
water rights ordinarily would not be charged with undertaking any restorative program.
In most cases the water table gradually will recharge itself, and diverted waters could
simply be allowed to return to their natural course. Attempting to repair any damage
already incurred would inevitably involve additional interference with the natural state
of the area.
88. Abrams, supra note 64, at 390.
89. The one site determined to be plausible for future water development that might
affect a wilderness area is located above Colorado's Cache La Poudre wilderness. See
Forest Service Rep., supra note 66.
90. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
91. Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Mont. 1968); Nevada v. United
States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), afd. on other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
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A broad quantification, while limiting future water developments,
also would benefit the western water interests. State appropriators
would gain certainty as to their rights and the possibilities for future
development. As many industries are discovering, compliance
counseling is vastly less expensive than are legal battles to allocate
guilt or innocence, and it also reduces the adverse publicity that can
accompany such lawsuits. Furthermore, such quantification would
conserve judicial resources by obviating the need for case-by-case
quantification.
(3) Government agencies that manage wilderness lands must be assigned a
duty to assert appurtenant federal reserved water rights.
The Wilderness Act provides federal agencies with discretion to
ascertain a means of preserving the wilderness character of desig-
nated areas. The decisions in both Block and Andrus explicitly defer
to this agency discretion, refusing to order the government to assert
federal reserved water rights so long as the integrity of the wilder-
ness is protected by some other means. "'[T]here is simply no spe-
cific legal duty on the part of federal defendants to claim reserved
water rights in the wilderness areas in state adjudications.' Creation
of any such duty lies with the Congress,"92 Judge Kane observed.
So long as this broad discretion operates, the existence of reserved
water rights will not assure the protection of these rights. Congress
must create an affirmative duty on the part of federal agencies to
protect these rights on behalf of the American people.93 Any other
means of protecting the water needs of these areas would prove
inadequate.
(4) The President's power to authorize exceptions from the provisions of the
Wilderness Act should be transferred to an appeals committee.
Despite the appeal of absolute prohibitions when dealing with
moral issues such as wilderness resources, experience has shown
that economics and immediate human needs will at times trump
moral and philosophic values. Should a case arise presenting a con-
flicting value of overriding importance, proponents could take their
case before an appeals committee with authority to determine if the
public interest in this case would be better served by granting the
exception. Such an appeals board, referred to as the "God Commit-
1980). See also Comment, The Application of Federal Reserved Water Rights to
Groundwater in the Western States, 16 Creighton L. Rev. 781, 807-08 (1983).
92. Lyng, 661 F. Supp. at 1500 (citing Block, 622 F. Supp. at 864).
93. For a full discussion of the duty of the federal offical to assert federal reserved
water rights in wilderness areas, see Abrams, supra note 64, at 387.
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tee," is already in place and functioning for exceptions to Endan-
gered Species Act protections.
The committee structure offers several advantages over tradi-
tional judicial review. This type of committee is comprised usually
of experts in the field who represent all major viewpoints. Such
technical expertise can be vitally important in these decisions. Fur-
thermore, by removing exceptional cases from the ordinary water
rights adjudication procedure, the power of the absolutely prohibi-
tive language of the statute is maintained. The committee process
perhaps would force a more in-depth examination of the issues
before a variance is awarded. Finally, the committee would relieve
the courts from having to balance policy concerns, an activity more
appropriate for a quasi-legislative body.
Legislation such as that described above would accomplish a vari-
ety of purposes. It would: (1) ensure that the effects of Block would
stand despite probable challenges based upon the New Mexico ruling;
(2) provide the quantification of rights needed by western water in-
terests for future planning and investment purposes; (3) revitalize
the prohibitive policy that underlies the Wilderness Act; and, (4)
save judicial and administrative resources by avoiding painstaking
case-by-case adjudications of the scope of these water rights.
Conclusion
The doctrine of federal reserved water rights is vital to the protec-
tion and preservation of the integrity of the National Wilderness
Preservation System. The basis for its application in these areas is
found in the language and legislative history of the Wilderness Act.
Already, significant inroads have been made on the traditional con-
cept of wilderness envisioned by proponents of the Wilderness Act
and described at the outset of this Current Topic. There is little
enough of our land remaining that legitimately could be called wil-
derness. That which does remain should not be destroyed piece-
meal by lackadaisical protection, especially of natural water flows.
As former National Park Service Director Newton Drury observed,
"Surely, we are not so poor that we need destroy them, or so rich
that we can afford to lose them.'9 4
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